It is indisputable that today the previous economic dominance of the West is being disrupted and a return to a new division of the world is taking place, while the relatively peaceful period since the fall of the Iron Curtain, in which a consensual system of international commitments prevailed, is coming to an end.
Today, the economic power of China is becoming at least comparable to the economic power of the West, which analysts describe as a new challenger and the future opponent of the West. Paradoxically, the war in Ukraine strengthens the role of China even more, which benefits economically from the Russian-Ukrainian war and also takes steps to achieve political benefits in international relations, let’s mention for example the role of mediator in Ukraine, or in the diplomatic involvement in the Middle East.
So it is not Russia, despite the declared statements and efforts to enforce a change in the world order by military force. Russia’s incompetence in the war with Ukraine significantly shakes its prestige. Thus, Russia loses not only politically, but due to economic sanctions, but also economically. In the West, closer cooperation between Western and Central Europe, the entry of Finland and perhaps Sweden into NATO strengthens the concept of a unified Western political and security architecture and its clear definition vis-à-vis Russia.
It goes without saying that these events also have an impact on balancing global public opinion. However, the authors of a paper titled: “A World Divided, Russia, China and the West” by the University of Cambridge, Centre for Future of Democracy (October 2022) suggest that balancing sympathies towards the main powers across the world cannot be reduced to simple economic interests or geopolitical positions. Rather, it follows a clear political and ideological divide between liberal and illiberal countries. There is no doubt that in a democratic world, there is a growing fear of Chinese economic engagement, however, a strengthening of public opinion in favor of China is symptomatic within less developed countries, along with countries that receive more Chinese foreign investment.
The paper shows that global public opinion towards Russia is polarized, with a large majority of the public in high-income democracies holding negative views, while pro-Russian sentiment (still) persists in continental Asia, the Middle East and Africa.
The result of the survey by the paper is that in the field of public opinion, 23% in liberal democracies and 70% in the rest of the world have a positive attitude towards China while sympathy towards Russia in Western democracies stands now at 12% and at 66% in the rest of the world. In addition, according to the paper, the United States has retained its popularity lead over China and Russia across most of the world while China and Russia are now narrowly ahead of the popularity among developing countries.
The paper deduces that it is difficult to predict how long the global divide will endure. On the one hand, the new high-income democracies in South America, Asia-Pacific or Eastern Europe are moving more towards the West. On the other hand, autocratic regimes may face significant internal threats and countries closer to China and Russia may be less stable and dependent on external aid.