The Samoa Agreement, also known as the EU-ACP Agreement, has recently sparked controversy in Africa’s most populous country, Nigeria. Some members of civil society have begun mobilizing Nigerians against the Samoa Agreement, expressing public opposition to the government’s intention to sign the agreement and bind Nigeria to its terms.
They argued that the agreement was incompatible with the country’s constitution and should be rejected to safeguard the country from potential pitfalls in the treaty.
The Samoa Agreement serves as the legal framework governing relationships between 15 states in the EU and approximately 79 states in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP). The agreement, officially established between the EU and ACP countries, was designed to promote trade and development cooperation. It acknowledges the need for reciprocal benefits for all parties involved.
Moreover, the agreement is subject to renegotiation every 20 years and was intended to be periodically revised, typically within the 20-year timeframe. The Samoa Agreement traces its roots to the Yaoundé Agreements of 1959, with the most recent iteration, the Cotonou Agreement, being negotiated in 2000.
In response to public calls from some civil society organizations operating in Nigeria, the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a statement defending its position. On Thursday, November 16, 2023, the MFA released a press statement with reference number MFA/PR/2023/28 outlining its position.
In the press statement, the MFA informed Nigerians that the Federal Government of Nigeria was not represented at the signing ceremony held in Samoa on Wednesday, November 15, 2023, and consequently has not yet signed the agreement. The statement concluded by affirming that ‘relevant Nigerian stakeholders are currently scrutinizing the agreement to ensure its provisions align with Nigeria’s domestic legislation.’
The MFA’s assertion that it has not yet completed its review of the treaty in November 2023, despite the expiration of the previous treaty, the Cotonou Agreement, in 2020, is perplexing. It raises the question of whether three years and some months are insufficient for the MFA to conduct a pre-treaty signing impact assessment of a proposed treaty and provide its recommendations.
For many Nigerians, the primary concern is not the time it has taken but rather the LGBTQ+ content in the treaty. In my opinion, it is a component of human rights, which is one of the six key priority areas. With the concerted efforts of other member states that do not subscribe to gay rights, that part can be revisited.
What about the other priority areas? Should Nigeria jettison the other important parts of the agreement that are beneficial to it? The potential benefit for Nigeria is demonstrable in many other parts of the agreement.
For instance, under the treaty, Nigeria will have improved access to EU markets; it will, ceteris paribus, attract foreign direct investment (FDI) from EU countries; and it will get EU-funded development assistance programs that support capacity building, infrastructure development, institutional reforms, and investment in sectors crucial for economic growth, etc.
Furthermore, I do not think signing the Samoa Agreement will pose a major problem for Nigeria. My conviction stems from the fact that signing a treaty does not impose legal obligations on the state. It merely signifies an initial endorsement or support for the treaty’s content and signifies the state’s intention to consider the treaty domestically. After careful consideration, the country may or may not ratify it.
However, once it is ratified, the state becomes a party to the treaty and is bound by its terms under international law. A country can sign a treaty with reservations that operate to exclude or modify the legal effect of that treaty provision in their application domestically. The rule is that reservations, if accepted by the other parties to the treaty, allow the reserving state to be a party to the treaty while exempting it from the offending provision or modifying its obligations under those provisions.
In addition, Nigeria is a dualist state that requires the transformation of treaties under Section 12 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution before a treaty can have effect in our courts.
Therefore, the delayed engagement in signing the ‘Samoa Agreement’ despite the expiration of the Cotonou Agreement reveals critical concerns. The Ministry’s prolonged evaluation, emphasizing LGBTQ+ issues while neglecting broader priority areas, questions the timeliness and inclusivity of the assessment process.
The potential benefits for Nigeria, including enhanced market access and developmental aid, warrant prudent consideration amidst the Ministry’s cautious approach. A decision to sign the agreement, not tantamount to immediate obligations, allows for deliberate domestic scrutiny and, if necessary, reservation options.
However, the extended evaluation duration seemingly contradicts the urgency of addressing crucial trade and developmental opportunities awaiting Nigeria within the EU-ACP partnership.
